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Abstract
In an e¤ort to stimulate more attractive football, the international football asso-
ciation FIFA, has introduced several new rules over the past decades. One of the
most recent rule change is the introduction of the ”sudden death” or ”golden goal”
rule for games going into overtime. This paper analyses under which conditions, if
any, the introduction of the sudden death rule improves the attractiveness of the
football game. Our theoretical results indicate that the new rule will change the
behavior of the teams, but not necessarily in the way intended. It may stimulate
more o¤ensive play during extra times, but only if a team considers itself having
a ”comparative advantage” in o¤ensive play vis-a-vis playing defensively. In other
cases it will induce more defensive playing. Empirical evidence suggests that both
may occur, but that the latter may be the more common situation and that the
introduction of the sudden death rule has induced more defensive soccer, i.e. the
opposite of the intention.
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1 Introduction
Football (also referred to as ”soccer”) is the world’s most popular sport. It is played
around the globe and the …nal game of the world championship in France 1998
between France and Brazil was watched by hundreds of millions of people.
Despite (or because) of the popularity of the game and its increasing commercial
success, o¢cials of football associations have worried about its attractiveness. In
an e¤ort to stimulate more attractive football, associations, including the European
football association UEFA and the international football association FIFA, have
introduced several new rules over the past decades. Recent rule changes are the
increase in the number of points (3 instead of 2) for a win and the rule forbidding
the goalkeeper to pick up the ball with his hands if it is passed back to him by one
of his teammates.
The most recent rule change is the introduction of the ”sudden death” or ”golden
goal” rule for games going into overtime. The sudden death rule stipulates that in
overtime, the team which scores a goal wins the game (and the game ends ”suddenly”
with the scoring of the goal).
The rule was …rst applied in international tournaments for national teams with
players below 21 years. In 1996 the sudden death rule was applied for the …rst
time in a European Championship for national teams (England ’96) and in 1998 it
was …rst introduced in a World Championship tournament (France ’98). For club
championships, the European football association …rst introduced it during the …nal
game of its UEFA Cup in 1998 (Inter Milan - Lazio Rome in Paris).
The impact of these changes are not always clear. Intuitively, one would expect
the increase in the number of points for games won and the prohibition of passing
back to the goalie to stimulate o¤ensive play and to complicate defensive play.
However, analysing the number of goals per match in England between 1888 and
1996, Palacios-Huertas (1998) shows that these rule changes a¤ected the variance of
the number of goals, but not its mean.
In the case of the sudden death rule, even the intuitive bene…t is not clear.
First, while it obviously raises the bene…ts of scoring a goal in overtime (and thus
presumably could stimulate more o¤ensive play) it simultaneously increases the
costs of receiving a goal (and thus presumably could stimulate more defensive play).
Second, football fans will admit that the time left after one team scores a goal in
overtime is often a very exciting part of the game, with one team forced to play very
o¤ensive football to try to even the score.
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In this paper we analyse under which conditions, if any, the introduction of the
sudden death rule improves the attractiveness of the football game. Our theoretical
results indicate that the new rule will change the behavior of the teams, but not
necessarily in the way intended. It may stimulate more o¤ensive play during extra
times, but only if a team considers itself having a ”comparative advantage” in o¤en-
sive play vis-a-vis playing defensively. In other cases it will induce more defensive
playing. Empirical evidence suggests that both may occur, but that the latter may
be the more common situation and that the introduction of the sudden death rule
have, on average, induced more defensive soccer.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we generate the theoretical setup
of the model and state our assumptions. In section 3, we derive the ex-ante end of
play utility under the old and the new rule. In section 4, we analyse the optimal
strategies for the teams and how the change in rules has a¤ected them. In section
5 we review empirical evidence.
2 Theoretical Setup of the model
Football games in knock-out tournaments go into extra times when the score is tied
after 90 minutes of play. Under the old rule, the extra time given is 30 minutes. If
the score is still tied after 30 minutes, the game is settled by a penalty shoot-out.
We divide the 30 minutes of extra time into an arbitrary T discrete time points
(say every minute is one point). We assume that the teams can score only one goal
at these time points (t) and T > 1:
We have two teams: team A and team B. We shall describe the game from
the point of view of team A. At every t; the state of the game from for team A is
described by the random state vector Xt; where
Xt =
8><>:
1 ; if team A scores a goal, at time t,
0 , if neither team scores a goal, at time t,
¡1 , if team B scores a goal, at time t.
The probabilities of this random variable are given by
P (Xt = 1) = p; P (Xt = ¡1) = q
P (Xt = 0) = r = 1¡ p ¡ q
The probability of team A scoring a goal is the same as the probability of team B
conceding a goal. This implies that the state vector of team B is ¡Xt: At every
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instant t there is a zero sum game between team A and team B. The probabilities
p and q are functions of the strategies of the teams.
We assume that the teams can choose between two strategies only: a defensive
strategy, denoted by L, and an o¤ensive strategy, denoted by H. We de…ne the
strategy sets of the two teams at a given moment as SA and SB; where
S i = fH;Lg; i = A;B:
The probability functions p and q are de…ned as
p : SA £ SB ! [0; 1] and q : SA£ SB ! [0; 1] :
Assumption (Increasing probability of scoring):
Throughout this paper we shall assume that the probability of scoring is higher
with o¤ensive football than with a defensive strategy. Formally:
p (H; :) > p (L; :) and q (:; H) > q (:; L) (1)
We de…ne the ex-ante strategy sets of the two teams for the entire game as SA
and SB ; where
Si = S i1 £ : : :£ SiT ; i = A;B: (2)
An element of Siis the vector s
¯
i=(si1; : : : ; s
i
t; : : : ; s
i
T ) where s
i
t = H or L; t =
1; : : : ; T:
3 Comparing ex-ante utilities of the teams
As stated in the introduction our motivation is to study the behaviour/strategies of
the teams under the two di¤erent policy regimes. We will do so by comparing the
ex-ante pay-o¤s of the teams. Since in the new rule the game is played only when
the scoreline is 0-0 it makes sense only to compare the expected payo¤ of the teams
when the score is 0-0 (the state of the game). For the other states it makes no sense
to compare the team behaviour / strategy since the game ends under the new rule
when a goal is scored.
3.1 The Old Rule.
The old rule states that, after the speci…ed time period of T , the team which has a
positive goal di¤erence is the winner. If there is no goal di¤erence, the game goes
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to a penalty shoot-out. We de…ne a random variable Zt; the goal di¤erence (from
team A ’s point of view) at time t: This stochastic process is a Markov chain (more
precisely a random walk on integers);
Zt = Zt¡1+Xt; t = 1; : : : ; T:
The transition probabilities of the stochastic process are
P (Zt = d
0jZt¡1 = d) =
8>><>>:
p if d0 = d + 1
r if d0 = d
q if d0 = d ¡ 1
0 otherwise
:
De…nition 1 The end of play utility Uz of team A is de…ned as
Uz = I fZT > 0g ¡ I fZT < 0g
where I f:g is the indicator function.
Team B’s end of play utility will be ¡Uz, which simply means that at the end
of the game if team A scores more goals than team B, team A wins and otherwise
team B wins.
De…nition 2 The ex-ante utility Vz of team A is de…ned as
Vz
¡
s
¯
A; sB
¢ :
= E (UzjZ0 = 0) ; (3)
where
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¢
is the strategy pair decided by team A and B.
For team B the ex-ante utility is ¡Vz
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¢
:
Using the following notation:
P
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
S
¢
=
Y
t2S
p
¡
sAt ; s
B
t
¢
Q
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
S
¢
=
Y
t2S
q
¡
sAt ; s
B
t
¢
R
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
S
¢
=
Y
t2S
r
¡
sAt ; s
B
t
¢
we can derive the following on the ex-ante utilities of the teams, summarised in
theorem 1 (see Appendix for Proof).
4
Theorem 1 Under the old rule
a)
Vz
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¢
= E (U jZ0 = 0) =
TX
d=1
X
T1 ;T2
R
¡
s
¯
A;s
¯
B
¯¯
N=T1 [ T2
¢
D
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
T1; T2
¢
where
D
¡
s
¯
A;s
¯
¯¯
T1; T2
¢
= P
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
¯¯
T1
¢
Q
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
¯¯
T2
¢ ¡Q ¡s
¯
A; s
¯
¯¯
T1
¢
P
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
¯¯
T2
¢
and T1; T2 , N=T1 [ T2 is a partition of N = f1; : : : ; T g such that jT1j ¡ jT2j = d.
b) In case of constant strategies,
¡
sAt ; s
B
t
¢
=
¡
sA; sB
¢
for all t;
Vz
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¢
= E (U jZ0 = 0)
=
TX
d=1
[T¡d2 ]X
k=0
T !
k!k + d!T ¡ d ¡ 2k!r
T¡d¡2k (pq)k
¡
pd ¡ qd¢
where p = p
¡
sA; sB
¢
, q = q
¡
sA; sB
¢
and r = r
¡
sA; sB
¢
:
Polominio (1999) analyses the game of football in general (similar to the extra-
time game under the old rule) in a dynamic setup. They derive three properties,
when attack is e¤ective (same as our Assumption 7).
² Teams with equal score attack
² Winning team defends and the other attack
² A loosing team is more likely to attack
We are not interested in the dynamic setup as the game under the new rule
will end when a team will score also ex-ante we do not know when the teams
will score. So the last to properties of the dynamic equilibrium will not happen
under the new rule hence there is no point in comparing the dynamic game
equlilibrium with the equlibrium of the ”golden goal rule”.
3.2 The New Rule
Under the new rule the team which …rst scores a goal within the 30 minutes of extra
time wins the game. If neither scores the game goes on to penalty shoot-outs, as
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under the old rule. This rule does not give a chance for the other team to come back
during the extra time. In terms of the stochastic process of goal di¤erence this is
similar to a random walk with absorbing barriers at 1 and ¡1:
In the new rule the game is played according to a Markov stochastic process Wt;
which has the following transition probabilities
P (Wt = d
0jWt¡1 = d) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1 if d0 = d 6= 0
p if d0 = +1 and d = 0
r if d0 = d = 0
q if d0 = ¡1and d = 0
0 otherwise
(4)
De…nition 3 The end of play the utility Uw of Team A is de…ned as,
Uw = I fWT > 0g ¡ I fWT < 0g
where I f:g is the indicator function.
De…nition 4 Under the new rule, the ex-ante utility of team A is
Vw
¡
sA; sB
¢ :
= E (Uw jW0 = 0) ; (5)
We can then derive the ex-ante utility under the new rule as:
Theorem 2 Under the new rule
a)
Vw
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¢
= E (WT jW0 = 0)
=
TX
t=1
R
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
St¡1
¢ ¡
p
¡
sAt ; s
B
t
¢ ¡ q ¡sAt ; sBt ¢¢
where St¡1 = f1; : : : ; t ¡ 1g
b ) In case of a constant strategy
¡
sAt ; s
B
t
¢
=
¡
sA; sB
¢
for all t;
E (WT jW0 = 0) = (p ¡ q)
¡
1¡ rT ¢
(1¡ r)
where p = p
¡
sA; sB
¢
, q = q
¡
sA; sB
¢
and r = r
¡
sA; sB
¢
:
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3.3 Optimal team strategies.
Team A will try to maximise its own objective, that is to win the game, by choosing
a strategy sequence that maximises the ex-ante payo¤. Team B’s optimal choice is
a strategy sequence that minimises the ex-ante payo¤. For both teams, the optimal
choice of the strategy sequence will be a convex combination of the strategies in the
strategy sets s
¯
i; i = A;B: To compare the equilibrium strategy sequences under the
old and the new rule, we make an additional assumption.
Assumption (Equality): We assume that the teams which are playing are
equally likely to score under similar situations and strategies. This is a reasonable
assumption given the fact that a game between two teams is more likely to go to
extra times if the teams are of similar qualities. (A similar assumption is made by
Palomino et al. (1999)). Formally,
De…nition 5 Teams A and B are de…ned to be equal if and only if
p
¡
sA; sB
¢
= q
¡
sB; sA
¢
. (6)
for all
¡
sA; sB
¢ 2 SA £ SB:
Theorem 3 Under the old rule, if team A maximises (team B minimises) end of
play utility,
a) the value of the game is 0, and
b) any symmetric pair of statigies (s
¯
; s
¯
) is an equilibrium.
This theorem 3 (proof: see appendix) implies that, under the old rule, in equi-
librium the optimal strategy sequences chosen by the teams are any symmetric pair
of strategy sequences. However this is no longer the case under the new rule. There
the equilibrium strategy will depend on whether the teams have a ”comparative
advantage” in playing o¤ensively or defensively.
This comparative advantage is de…ned as follows. A team has a comparative
advantage in playing o¤ensive football (i.e. ”attack is e¤ective”) if the team is
more likely to score playing an o¤ensive strategy against a defending team of equal
quality compared to when it plays defensively against an equal quality team playing
o¤ensively. Formally,
De…nition 6 Team A has a comparative advantage in playing o¤ensive football if
and only if
p (H;L) > p (L;H) (7)
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Inversely, a team has a comparative advantage in playing defensive football if the
team is less likely to score playing an o¤ensive strategy against a defending team of
equal quality compared to when it plays defensively against an equal quality team
playing o¤ensively. That is,
p (H;L) < p (L;H) (8)
Empirically, an (extreme) example of teams with a comparative advantage in defen-
sive football are teams specialized in playing ”counter-attack”. Such team strategies
have most of the players to play defensively, preventing the other team from scor-
ing, with just a few o¤ensive players, specialized in scoring on fast outbreaks from
the defensive strategy. However, also other teams may consider defense to be more
e¤ective than o¤ense.
Theorem 4 Under the new rule, if team A maximises (team B minimises) end of
play utility,
a) the value of the game is 0,
b) if teams have a comparative advantage in playing o¤ensive football then (H
¯
;H
¯
)
is the only equilibrium,
c) otherwise (L
¯
;L
¯
) is the only equilibrium
where H
¯
is a n¡vector of H 0s and L
¯
is a n-vector of L0s
Theorem 4 (proof: see appendix) states that under the new rule the optimum
strategy is still a symmetric equilibrium, but much more restricted than under the
old rule. Depending on the comparative advantage of the teams there is only one
equilibrium. Since both teams are assumed to have similar qualities, they have the
same comparative advantage – by de…nition. Theorem 4 implies that teams will at
all times opt for the strategy in which they have a comparative advantage. The
reason is that since there will be no more ”second chance”, i.e. an opportunity to
score after the other team has scored, that both teams will at all times specialize in
the strategy in which they have a comparative advantage.
This implies that the impact of the change in the rule on the likelihood that both
teams will play o¤ensively, depends on the comparative advantage of the team. In
case the teams have an advantage in o¤ensive play, the result will be more o¤ensive
play under the new rule. However in case that the teams consider themselves as
having an advantage in defensive play, they will play more defensively under the new
rule. In the latter case the impact of the new rule is opposite to what it intended.
8
The extreme example being teams specialised in ”counter attack”. Since both
teams are specialised in counter attack, they wait so that their opponents attacks
them, whereby they can go into counter attack mode and score the winning goal.
The game in the mean time gets boring since neither of the team would give the
other the advantage of mounting a counter attack , the spectators only see the two
playing the defensive waiting game.
In addition, all the o¤ensive play and excitement which normally results after a
goalwas scored in extra-times is lost under the new rule – independent of the strategy
choice before one team scored. This is independent of the comparative advantage
of the teams since each team is more likely to score playing o¤ensively, hence it
will play o¤ensively after the other team has scored. This “dynamic equilibrium” is
shown in a regular game framework by Palomino (1999).
4 Empirical evidence
Since the impact of the rule change is conditional in the theory, let us take a look
at what the empirically evidence suggests. The empirical evidence so far is limited
for drawing any strong conclusions. However, at the very least, it does not support
the case that the sudden death rule has stimulated more attractive soccer.
After the introduction of the golden goal, two major international tournaments
were played. During the 1996 European Championship (EC) tournament in Eng-
land, 5 games went into extra times and 4 ended scoreless, still requiring penalty
kicks to decide. Only in the …nal game a goal by Bierho¤, 5 minutes into extra times,
secured the game (and the title) for Germany against the Czech Republic. Similarly,
during the 1998 World Championship tournament in France, only in 1 of 4 games
that went into extra times a goal was scored. However in the most recent EURO
2000 tournament two out of three games that went into extra-time were decided by
a golden goal.
The data in Table 1 suggests that the introduction of the golden goal rule has, on
average, reduced the likelihood of a goal being scored in extra times (34% compared
to 47% before the introduction of Golden goal rule). During the 3 World Champi-
onship (WC) tournaments before the golden goal rule was introduced, in 40-50% of
the extra times at least one goal was scored, almost double the percentage of the
WC 1998 and the EC 1996 tournament. However, this percentage was considerably
higher (67%) during Euro 2000, a tournament generally characterised by more of-
fensive soccer. This observation may be consistant with our result that the golden
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goal rule will be more likely to lead to more o¤ensive play, and hence presumeably
more goals, with teams holding a comparative advantage in o¤ensive play.
Finally, as mentioned before, the sudden death rule cancels the exciting part of
the extra time after one goal is scored. Table 1 indicates that the likelihood that
a second goal was scored in extra time under the old rule was almost as high on
average (26 %) than a single goal being scored under the new rule (34%).
[Table1]
5 Conclusion
In this article we have analysed the e¤ect of the change of the football rule in the
extra time play. Under the old regime the rule was that the two teams will play 30
minutes during the extra time and the team which scores most goals wins. With the
introduction of the ”golden goal” or ”sudden death” rule, the team which scores …rst
wins. To compare the change of behaviour of the teams, we looked at the ex-ante
pay-o¤s of the teams when the score line is 0-0. This is done since the game would
stop under the new rule if either of the teams score a goal.
Our theoretical analysis shows that under the new rule the optimum strategy for
both teams is to opt for the strategy in which they have a ’comparative advantage’.
The reason is that since there will be no more ”second chance”, i.e. an opportunity
to score after the other team has scored, so both teams will at all times specialize
in their comparative advantage strategy. The impact of the change in the rule
on the likelihood that both teams will play o¤ensively, therefore depends on the
characteristics and qualities of the teams in the game. In case the teams have an
advantage in o¤ensive play, the result will be more o¤ensive play under the new
rule. However in case that the teams consider themselves as having an advantage
in defensive play, they will play more defensively under the new rule. In the latter
case the impact of the new rule is opposite to what it intended.
The empirical evidence is limited because only few tournaments were played
since the introduction of the rule. The evidence suggests that both cases may have
occured, although more defensive play seems to be the more common case. The
data do not support the case that on average the sudden death rule has stimulated
more attractive soccer. To the contrary, comparing the most important international
football tournaments after the introducton of the sudden death rule with the most
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important tournaments before, yields that both the number of goals scored in extra
times as the likelihood that a goal is scored during extra-times has decreased. These
data suggest that the introduction of the golden goal rule has reduced the likelihood
of a goal being scored in extra times, although the opposite may occur with teams
having stronger o¤ensive qualities.
In addition, all the o¤ensive play and excitement which resulted under the old
rule after a goal was scored in extra-times is lost under the new rule. This is
independent of the comparative advantage of the teams since any team will play
o¤ensively after the other team has scored. In fact, the data indicate that the
likelihood that a second goal was scored in extra time under the old rule was almost
as high than a single goal being scored under the new rule.
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7 Appendix: Proof of Results
Proof of Theorem 1 a) By de…nition it follows that
E (UzjZ0 = 0) = Pr (ZT > 0jZ0 = 0) ¡ Pr (ZT < 0jZ0 = 0)
=
TX
d=1
Pr(ZT = djZ0 = 0) ¡ Pr (ZT = ¡djZ0 = 0)
De…ne a partition of N = f1; : : : ; Tg as T1 = ft : Xt = 1g ; T2 = ft : Xt = ¡1g and
N=T1 [ T2 = ft : Xt = 0g : Then jT1j is the number of goals scored by team A and
jT2j is the number of goals scored by team B. So if jT1j ¡ jT2j= d, team A wins by
d goals. Notice that T1; T2 and N=T1[ T2; is an arbitary partition of N; so team A
can win by d goals with any such parition as long as jT1j ¡ jT2j = d.
Let
¼ (T1; T2) = Pr
0B@ fXt : t 2 T1g ;fXt : t 2 T2g ;
fXt : t 2 N=T1 [ T2g
1CA
be the probability that team A scores at times t 2 T1 and team B scores (team A
conceeds a goal) at times t 2 T2: Hence
Pr (ZT = djZ0 = 0) =
[T¡d2 ]X
k=0
X
T1 :jT1j=k+d
X
T2 :jT2 j=k
¼ (T1; T2)
=
X
T1;T2 :jT1 j¡jT2j=d
¼ (T1; T2)
where T1; T2 and N=T1[ T2 is a partition of N: Also notice that
¼ (T1; T2) = P
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
T1
¢
Q
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
T2
¢
R
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
N=T1[ T2
¢
Therefore
Pr (ZT = djZ0 = 0)
=
X
T1 ;T2:jT1 j¡jT2 j=d
R
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
N=T1[ T2
¢
P
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
T1
¢
Q
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
T2
¢
Similarly (notice that team A now loses by d goals)
Pr (ZT = ¡djZ0 = 0)
=
X
T1 ;T2:jT1 j¡jT2 j=d
R
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
N=T1[ T2
¢
P
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
T2
¢
Q
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
T1
¢
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Therefore
TX
d=1
Pr (ZT = djZ0 = 0)¡ Pr (ZT = ¡djZ0 = 0)
=
X
T1 ;T2:jT1j¡jT2 j=d
R
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
N=T1[ T2
¢
D
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
T1; T2
¢
b) Notice that given integers d and k = 0; : : : ;
£
T¡d
2
¤
we have T !k!k+d!T¡d¡2k! pos-
sible partitions. Therefore,
Pr (ZT = djZ0 = 0)
=
[T¡d2 ]X
k=0
T !
k!k + d!T ¡ d ¡ 2k!r
¡
sA; sB
¢T¡2k+d
q
¡
sA; sB
¢k
p
¡
sA; sB
¢k+d
Pr (ZT = ¡djZ0 = 0)
=
[T¡d2 ]X
k=0
T !
k!k + d!T ¡ d ¡ 2k!r
¡
sA; sB
¢T¡2k+d
q
¡
sA; sB
¢k+d
p
¡
sA; sB
¢k
This implies that in case of constant strategies,
¡
sAt ; s
B
t
¢
=
¡
sA; sB
¢
for all t;
E (U jZ0 = 0) =
TX
d=1
[T¡d2 ]X
k=0
T !
k!k + d!T ¡ d ¡ 2k!r
T¡d¡2k (pq)k
¡
pd ¡ qd¢
where p = p
¡
sA; sB
¢
, q = q
¡
sA; sB
¢
and r = r
¡
sA; sB
¢
:
Proof of theorem 2: a) By de…nition it implies that,
E (UwjW0 = 0) = Pr (WT = 1jW0 = 0) ¡ Pr(WT = ¡1jW0 = 0)
Notice that,
Pr (WT = 1jW0 = 0) =
TX
t=1
Pr(Xt = 1; Xt0 = 0 8 t0 < t)
=
TX
t=1
Pr(Xt = 1)
Y
t02St¡1
Pr ( Xt0 = 0)
=
TX
t=1
p
¡
sAt ; s
B
t
¢
R
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
St¡1
¢
(9)
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Similarly for
Pr (WT = ¡1jW0 = 0) =
TX
t=1
q
¡
sAt ; s
B
t
¢
R
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
St¡1
¢
: (10)
Combining (9) and (10) we get
E (UwjW0 = 0) =
TX
t=1
¡
p
¡
sAt ; s
B
t
¢ ¡ q ¡sAt ; sBt ¢¢R ¡s¯A; s¯B ¯¯St¡1¢ :
b) If
¡
sAt ; s
B
t
¢
=
¡
sA; sB
¢
then
TX
t=1
¡
p
¡
sAt ; s
B
t
¢ ¡ q ¡sAt ; sBt ¢¢R ¡s¯A; s¯B ¯¯St¡1¢
=
¡
p
¡
sA; sB
¢ ¡ q ¡sA; sB¢¢ TX
t=1
r
¡
sA; sB
¢t¡1
=
¡
p
¡
sA; sB
¢ ¡ q ¡sA; sB¢¢ 1¡ r ¡sA; sB¢T
1 ¡ r (sA; sB) :
Lemma 1 Under the assumption that teams are equal we have
i) R
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
T
¢
= R
¡
s
¯
B; s
¯
A
¯¯
T
¢
for all T ½ N
ii) Q
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
T
¢
= P
¡
s
¯
B; s
¯
A
¯¯
T
¢
for all T ½N
iii) p
¡
sA; sB
¢ ¡ q ¡sA; sB¢ = ¡ ¡p¡sB; sA¢ ¡ q ¡sB; sA¢¢
Proof of Lemma 1 :
i)
R
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
T
¢
=
Y
t2T
r
¡
sAt ; s
B
t
¢
=
Y
t2T
¡
1¡ p ¡sAt ; sBt ¢ ¡ q ¡sAt ; sBt ¢¢
=
Y
t2T
¡
1¡ q ¡sBt ; sAt ¢ ¡ p¡sBt ; sAt ¢¢ (by (6) )
= R
¡
s
¯
B; s
¯
A
¯¯
T
¢
ii)
Q
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¯¯
T
¢
=
Y
t2T
q
¡
sAt ; s
B
t
¢
=
Y
t2T
p
¡
sAt ; s
B
t
¢
; (by (6) )
= P
¡
s
¯
B; s
¯
A
¯¯
T
¢
iii)
p
¡
sA; sB
¢ ¡ q ¡sA; sB¢ = ¡q ¡sB; sA¢ ¡ p¡sB; sA¢¢ (by (6) )
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Proof of Theorem 3: Notice that using theorem (1) and Lemma (1), we have
Vz
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¢
= ¡Vz
¡
s
¯
B; s
¯
A
¢
(11)
The payo¤ matrix is skew-symmetric, where the vertices are all the sequences of the
H and L as de…ned in (2)
a) Since the payo¤ matrix is skew-symmetric the value of the game is 0 (See
Owen 1995, page 29) and any equilibrium strategy will be of the form s
¯
B = s
¯
A = s
¯
b) We shall show that (s
¯
; s
¯
) is a pure strategy equilibrium for any s
¯
. Let st0 = H
without loss of generality: Let s
¯
A be the strategy vector with sAt0 = L and s
A
t = st
8 t 6= t0 Team A will then deviate at time t0; if
Vz
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
¢ ¡ Vz (s¯; s¯) > 0 (12)
From (11) we know Vz (s¯
; s
¯
) = 0 ; for any s
¯
. So team A deviates if
Vz
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
¢
> 0
Notice that for any given partition of N; T1; T2 and N=T1 [ T2,
P
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
T1
¢
= P ( s
¯
; sj¯T1 ¡ ft0g) p (L;H) if t0 2 T1 (13)
= P ( s
¯
; sj¯T1) if t0 62 T1
Q
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
T2
¢
= P ( s
¯
; sj¯T2 ¡ ft0g) q (L;H) if t0 2 T2 (14)
= P ( s
¯
; sj¯T2) if t0 62 T2
R
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
N=T1[ T2
¢
= R ( s
¯
; sj¯N=T1 [ T2) if t0 2 T1 [ T2 (15)
= R (s
¯
; s j¯N=T1 [ T2¡ ft0g) r (L;H) if t0 2 N=T1 [ T2
Therefore using (15), (13) and (14) we have
D
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
T1; T2
¢
= P
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
T1
¢
Q
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
T2
¢ ¡Q ¡s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
T1
¢
P
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
T2
¢
D
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
T1; T2
¢
=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
P (s
¯
; sj¯T1 ¡ ft0g)p (L;H)Q ( s¯; sj¯ T2)¡Q ( s
¯
; sj¯T1 ¡ ft0g) q (L;H)P ( s¯; sj¯ T2)
if t0 2 T1
P ( s
¯
; sj¯T1)Q ( s¯; sj¯T2 ¡ ft0g) q (L;H)¡Q ( s
¯
; sj¯T1)P ( s¯; sj¯T2 ¡ ft0g) p (L;H)
if t0 2 T2
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By the lemma (1) we have
D
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
T1; T2
¢
=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
P ( s
¯
; sj¯T1 ¡ ft0g)P (s¯; s j¯T2) p (L;H)¡P (s
¯
; sj¯ T1 ¡ ft0g)P ( s¯; sj¯T2)q (L;H)
if t0 2 T1
P ( s
¯
; sj¯T1)P ( s¯; sj¯T2¡ ft0g) q (L;H)¡P ( s
¯
; sj¯T1)P ( s¯; sj¯ T2 ¡ft0g) p (L;H)
if t0 2 T2
=
(
P ( s
¯
; sj¯T1 [ T2 ¡ ft0g) (p (L;H) ¡ q (L;H)) if t0 2 T1
P ( s
¯
; sj¯T1 [ T2 ¡ ft0g) (q (L;H)¡ p (L;H)) if t0 2 T2
Also notice that if t0 2 N=T1 [ T2; using lemma (1) and (15), (13)
D
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
T1; T2
¢
= 0
Let us now calculate Vz
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
¢
:
Vz
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
¢
=
TX
d=1
X
T1 ;T2:jT1j¡jT2 j=d
R
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
N=T1 [ T2
¢
D
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
T1; T2
¢
We split the the inner sum (the sum over partitions) into three parts depending on
which part t0 belongs (since T1; T2and N=T1 [T2is a partition t0 has to be only one
of the three parts)
Vz
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
¢
=
TX
d=1
X
t02T1
R
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
N=T1 [ T2
¢
D
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
T1; T2
¢
+
X
t02T2
R
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
N=T1 [ T2
¢
D
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
T1; T2
¢
+
X
t02N=T1[T2
R
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
N=T1 [ T2
¢
D
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
T1; T2
¢
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=
TX
d=1
X
t02T1
R ( s
¯
; sj¯N=T1 [ T2)D
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
T1; T2
¢
+
X
t02T2
R ( s
¯
; sj¯N=T1 [ T2)D
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
T1; T2
¢
=
TX
d=1
( X
t02T1
R (s
¯
; sj¯N=T1[ T2)P (s¯; sj¯T1 [ T2 ¡ ft0g) (p (L;H)¡ q (L;H))
+
X
t02T2
R (s
¯
; s j¯N=T1 [ T2)P (s¯; s j¯T1 [ T2 ¡ ft0g) (q (L;H) ¡ p (L;H))
)
=
TX
d=1
X
t02T1[T2
R (s
¯
; s j¯N=T1 [ T2)P ( s¯; sj¯ T1 [ T2 ¡ ft0g)
(
(p (L;H )¡ q (L;H))
+ (q (L;H )¡ p (L;H))
)
= 0
Since there is no positive payo¤ due to deviation and therefore team A does not
deviate. As this is a zero-sum game team B also does not deviate (s
¯
; s
¯
) is
If the teams want to deviate at multiple time points t1; ; tk;there is also no positive
payo¤, the proof of which is similar. Therefore (s
¯
; s
¯
) are optimal strategies.
Proof of Theorem 4: Notice that using theorem (1) and Lemma (1), we have
Vw
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯
B
¢
= ¡Vw
¡
s
¯
B; s
¯
A
¢
(16)
The payo¤ matrix is a skew-symmetric, with the vertices being all the sequences of
H and L as de…ned in (2)
a) Since the payo¤ matrix is a skew-symmetric matrix of the game is 0.(See Owen
1995, page 29) and any equilibrium strategy will be of the form s
¯
B = s
¯
A = s
¯
b) Let p (H;L) ¡ p (L;H) = ® > 0 and H
¯
=(H; : : : ; H ) :We prove the statement
in two parts
1) (H
¯
;H
¯
) is an equilibrium and
2) Any other pair of strategies (s
¯
; s
¯
) are not equilibrium strategies.
Let s
¯
A be the strategy vector with sAt0 = L and s
A
t =H 8 t 6= t0 Team A will
then deviate at time t0; if
Vw
¡
s
¯
A;H
¯
¢ ¡ Vw (s¯;H¯ ) > 0 (17)
From (11) we know that Vw (H¯
;H
¯
) = 0 ; for any s
¯
.. So team A deviates if
Vw
¡
s
¯
A;H
¯
¢
> 0
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Notice that
Vw
¡
sA;H
¯
¢
=
TX
t=1
R
¡
s
¯
A;H
¯
¯¯
St¡1
¢¡
p
¡
sAt ; H
¢ ¡ q ¡sAt ; H¢¢
=
TX
t=1;t6=t0
R
¡
s
¯
A;H
¯
¯¯
St¡1
¢
(p (H;H )¡ q (H;H))
+ R
¡
s
¯
A;H
¯
¯¯
St0¡1
¢
(p (L;H) ¡ q (L;H ))
= R
¡
s
¯
A;H
¯
¯¯
St0¡1
¢
(p (L;H)¡ q (L;H)) (by Symmetry)
= R
¡
s
¯
A;H
¯
¯¯
St0¡1
¢
(p (L;H)¡ p (H;L)) (by Symmetry)
= ¡®R ¡s
¯
A;H
¯
¯¯
St0¡1
¢
So there is a negative payo¤ for deviation and therefore team A does not deviate.
The same holds for team B. If the teams want to deviate at multiple time points
t1; ; tk;there is also a negative payo¤, the proof of which is similar as above.
Hence (H
¯
,H
¯
) is an equilibrium.
Secondly, we need to prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium. As the payo¤
matrix is skew symmetric the there is asymmetric equilibrium. So any equilibrium
must be of the form (s
¯
; s
¯
) : We shall show that if s
¯
6= H
¯
, there is a positive payo¤ for
team A to deviate.
If s
¯
6= H
¯
, then 9 t0 s:t st0 = L:
Let team A deviate at t0; and playsH: Let s¯
A be the strategy vector with sAt0 = L
and sAt = st8 t 6= t0: Then
Vw
¡
sA; s
¯
¢
=
TX
t=1
R
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
St¡1
¢ ¡
p
¡
sAt ; st
¢ ¡ q ¡sAt ; st¢¢
=
TX
t=1;t6=t0
R
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
St¡1
¢
(p (st;st)¡ q (st; st))
+ R
¡
s
¯
A; s
¯¯¯
St0¡1
¢
(p (H;L) ¡ q (H;L))
= 0 +R ( s
¯
; sj¯St0¡1) (p (H;L)¡ p (L;H )) (by Lemma (1))
= ®R ( s
¯
; sj¯St0¡1) > 0
Hence team A will deviate. The same holds for team B. Therefore (s
¯
; s
¯
) is not an
equilibrium strategy pair. Hence (H
¯
,H
¯
) is an unique equilibrium.
c) If ® < 0; then (L
¯
;L
¯
) will be the only equilibrium. Proof is similar as b)
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8 Tables
Table 1: Scoring in extra-time (ET) games in recent World Championship
(WC) and European Championship (EC) tournaments (*)
Tournament
Games
in ET
Goals
scored
in ET
Games
with
goals
scored
in ET
Average
number
of goals
per
ET-games
ET-games
with goals
scored
(% of total)
ET-games
with more
than 1 goal
scored
(% of total)
EC 2000 3 2 2 0.67 67 -
WC 1998 4 1 1 0.25 25 -
EC 1996 5 1 1 0.20 20 -
WC 1994 4 3 2 0.50 50 25
WC 1990 8 6 4 0.75 50 12.5
WC 1986 5 5 2 1.00 40 40
(*) WC tournaments had 16 knock-out games, the EC 1996, 2000 tournament
7; EC tournaments in 1992 and 1988 had only 3.
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